Two keys
Two devices, and both have to agree.
Set up a wallet whose money only moves when two devices sign. Someone who steals one phone, or finds one recovery phrase, still cannot spend a thing.
The risk is the maker, not just the thief. Hardware has shipped with keys an attacker could guess; software has shipped with signing bugs. Either takes everything behind it at once, and you cannot audit your way out. Two keys on devices from two different makers means one of them can be wrong and your money survives it.
And nobody has to know you did it. Combined the aggregated way, two keys produce one signature: 64 bytes, no policy published. Nobody learns that a second device exists, where it is, or whose hardware it is. Most multisig tells anyone reading the chain all three.
Why two beats one: two devices running the same app share whatever that app gets wrong, so the pair is strongest when they come from different makers. Winnow's multisig is a published Bitcoin standard rather than a scheme of its own, which is what lets the second key live somewhere else.